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ISAPPOINTMENT in recent domestic economic
performance has sparked increasing interest in the
role of the federal government in the U.S. economy.
As it is widely believed that government deficits con-
tribute to inflation, much of the public concern focuses
on the size of the federal budget deficit and the growth
of federal indebtedness.
Since the government finances most of its spending
in excess of tax receipts by issuing new debt, con-
tinued budget deficits enlarge the amount of federal
debt outstanding. For instance, the large budget defi-
cits of the last four years have contributed to about a
$250 billion increase in Treasury debt outstanding
from December 1975 to September 1979.
While the federal deficit is coming under closer
public scrutiny, a substantial portion of federally re-
lated programs and their associated debt has escaped
much of this attention. Specifically, the debt of fed-
erally owned and federally sponsored agencies is
often overlooked.m Like the debt of the Treasury (or,
for that matter, any other debt), agency debt has im-
portant effects on capital markets.
This article focuses on this additional source of
federal influence on capital markets. To provide the
mFederally sponsored agencies are, techrmically, independent
private enterprises that have been created by congressional
legislation. Despite this independent status, these agencies
remain subject to broad policy guidance from the federal
government.
Page 10
necessary background and perspective, the article first
examines the general nature and function of the
agencies. Unlike most discussions of these agencies,
which focus primarily on their microeconomic effects,
this article considers the macroeconomic implications
of agency debt operations.
FEDERAL AGENCIES AND
SPONSORED AGENCIES
The federal government conducts its business
through various departments and agencies, which
for the most part receive their authorization to spend
(appropriations) through the budget process. De-
cisions about the level and allocation of federal spend-
ing are reflected in the budget of the U.S. govern-
ment.2 This authorized budget spending is primarily
financed by the Treasury’s tax receipts and by sales
of Treasury debt, although some on-budget agencies
are authorized to issue their own debt (panel Ao fex-
hibit 1). Spending of some federally owned agencies,
however, is placed outside the budgetary process and
is designated as “off-budget.” Panel Bo fexhibit 1
lists these federally owned, off-budget agencies.
2
Although the unified bndget concept represents the official
budget of the federal government, the national income ac-
counts (NIA) concept is more frequently used in evaluating
economic activity. For a description of these two budget con-
cepts, see David J. Ott and Attiat F. Ott, Federal Budget
Policy, 3rd ed. (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution,
1977), pp. 4-23.
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In addition, the federal government sponsors a num-
ber of other “private” agencies, whose spending is
also excluded from the federal budget. These spon-
sored agencies are listed in panel C of exhibit 1.
Functions of Government Agencies
Federally Owned Agencies
Though the off-budget agencies listed in panel B of
exhibit 1 are wholly owned by the U.S. government,
their spending is not reflected in the unified budget
totals, despite the recommendation of the President’s
Commission on Budget Concepts that the unified
budget”... include all programs of the federal
tm
Sometimes, however, imperfections are confused with economic
differentiation. It is not an imperfection of the capital market
when ami unrestricted market assigns a higher risk premium
to certain activities, since some projects entail more risk
than others. If riskier projects are to succeed in attracting
financial capital, they must offer investors a higher potential
return. The primary function of a competitive capital. market
is to allocate credit to’vard the most promising among alter-
native projects for a given level of risk. In a free market,
lenders bear the risk inherent in a given project, Government
loan guarantees, loan participations, and other subsidies that
are channelled through government agencies do not eliminate
the inherent risk of making loans to certain groups; they
simply spread the risk over a larger segment of society, the
taxpaying public.
1
Report of the Pre,s’ide,mt’s Commission on Budget Concepts
(Government Primmting Office, 1967), p. 7.
0
The statutory debt limitation refers to the legal ceiling of the
debt of the federal govenmmocnt, as set by Congress. Oimly the
House of Representatives may immitiate changes in this statutomy
debt limit, which was $830 billion as of June 30, 1979,
While constitmmting a legal ceiling on outstanding debt, the
debt limitation has been changed by Congress whenever gov-
ernment financing needs have nudged against the ceiling.
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While some agencies, such as the Postal Service or
the Tennessee Valley Authority, mainly provide cer-
tain services, the primary function of many federal
agencies is to allocate credit to particular sectors of
the economy. For instance, the Federal Housing Ad-
ministration (FHA) was established in the 1930s to
mitigate the increase in mortgage foreclosures that
accompanied the Depression. Similarly, a variety of
other federal agencies has been established to allocate
credit to particular sectors such as housing (e.g., Fed-
eral National Mortgage Association), agriculture (e.g.,
Federal Land Banks), small businesses (e.g., Small
Business Administration), and international trade
(e.g., Export-Import Bank).
The justification for directing agency aid to particu-’
lar sectors generally relies on allegations that capital
market imperfections prevent resources from flowing
naturally to certain socially desirable activities. These
alleged imperfections include monopolistic elements
in lending markets, economies of scale enjoyed by
some borrowers but not others, and external benefits
to society in excess of those capturable by the bor-
rower (and ultimately the lender). The belief that
such imperfections discriminate “unfairly” against par-
ticular sectors or classes of borrowers within the econ-




A. On Budget Entities A thorised to Issue Debt Not Sobtect
to Federal Debt him, tations
Government National Mortgage Association (ONMA)
Export-Import Sank of the United States (Ex-Im Sank)
Tennes ee Valley Authority (WA)
Family Nov ing Program of the Defense Department
S. Federally Owned Off-budget Agencies
Rural Electrification and Telephone Revolving Fund
Rural Telephone Sank
Pension Benefit Guaranty Co poratian
Postal Service
Federal Financing Sank (FF3)
Regional Rail Reorgani allan Program of the U.S Railway
Association
C. Federally Span ored Agencies
Federal National Mortgage Assacrotian (FNMA)
Student Loan Marketing Association (SEMI.)
Soaks foe Cooperatives
Federal Ifitermediate Credit Soaks (FICB)
3
Federat Lend Ranks (FEB)
4
Federal Name Loan Banks (EKES)
Federal Name Loan Mortgage Corporation (FNLMC)
mcon%ened to p i t a n shim, in Septe,nb 19 8
eated a m, rate en mum ,n June 19 5.
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iCreatod a privat corpo ation in July 19 0
government and its [wholl~os nedj agencies.”4 Some
of these ag ncies’ activities ame nevemtheless, subject
to congressional and presid ntial review.
Both on-budget and off-budget federal agencies
allocate credit primarily thmough the administration
of loan programs directed towaid particular sectors
of the econom - The agencies may grant loans either
directl , bs lending to specific bomsowers, oi indirectly,
by purchasing loans initiated by private lenders but
guaranteed or insured by the fedesal government.
Loan are financed either h\ the lreasur\ or
agency bormowing. The Treasury-financed postion of
the agencies’ activities is like all Treasusy debt sub-
ject to statutosy debt liniitations,~FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS NOVEMBER 1979
Debt issued directly by off-budget agencies, how-
ever, is free from these statutory limitations, although
it is reported by the Treasury as part of gross federal
debt. In addition, there are some on-budget agencies
that can issue debt which is not subject to statutory
limitation (see panel Ao fexhibit 1). Consequently,
federal debt subject to statutory limitation, a fre-
quently used measure of the overall government debt,
understates the full extent of direct federal govern-
ment borrowing. For instance, at the end of June
1979, outstanding Treasury debt. was $804.9 billion
while federally owned agency debt was $7.3 billion,
for a total of $812.2 billion, Of this total, only $806
billion was subject to the prevailing statutory limit of
8830 billion.
Since 1973, outlays of federally owned, off-budget
agencies have increased rapidly’ (table 1),6 This rapid
growth has largely been associated with the activity
of the Federal Financing Bank (FFB), an intermedi-
ary that merits special attention.
The Federal Financing Bank
In December 1973, Congress established the Fed-
eral Financing Bank as an independent agency of the
U.S. government.7 The FFB acts as an intermediary
by coordinating the federally owned agencies’ fund-
raising activity in U.S. capital markets. Of the fed-
erally sponsored agencies (panel C of exhibit I.), only
the Student Loan Marketing Association (SLMA) is
eligible for FFB financing.8
The FFB facilitates the funding of various agencies’
programs in three ways. First, it acquires new or out-
standing debt from federally owned agencies. This
effectively’ reduces competition among the agencies
and the Treasury for the existing supply of loanable
funds in capital markets. Testimony given in the
congressional hearings on the creation of the FFB
clearly reveals this to be the primary function in-
tended for the FFB. The declining volume of off-
budget, federally owned agency debt provides evi-
dence that the FFB has succeeded in reducing the
independent debt operations of these agencies.
Second, it acquires loan assets from federal agen-
cies and third, it acquires loans that have been guar-
Ooutlays, in general, refer to the expenditures and loans of an
agcncy.
~The actual operations of the FF13 are carried out in an office
within the U.S. Treasumy.
ttiven though the SLMA is an independent, federally spon-
sored agency, its loan assets are fully gimaranteed by the gov-
ernment and are, therefore, eligible for FF13 financing.
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anteed by other federally owned agencies.9 As dis-
cussed below, both of these FFB transactions can be
used by agencies as alternatives to debt issuance in
financing agency programs. FFB acquisition of agen-
cies’ loan assets and guaranteed loans in 1978 had
risen to about two-thirds of its financing of agency
activity.
In all three cases, the FFB finances its activity
either by issuing its own debt or by borrowing di-
rectly from the Treasury. Though the FFB is author-
ized to issue up to $15 billion of its own securities,
it has raised virtually all of its funds through Treas-
ury borrowing. On the only occasion when it issued
its own securities, its market-determined borrowing
costs were considerably higher than anticipated.
The rationale for creating the FFB was to lower the
cost of marketing agency debt by effectively consoli-
dating the debt of several agencies and by coordinat-
ing its placement. The differential between the rate
paid on the FFB’s borrowings and that earned on its
holdings of various agencies’ debt covers its operating
expenses. The FFB currently acquires agency debt at
a yield 12.5 basis points (½percentage point) above
the interest rate on Treasury securities of comparable
maturity. The FFB itself borrows from the Treasury
at this latter rate.
The balance sheets of a typical agency, the FFB,
and the Treasury help to illustrate the method of
“For simplicity, guaranteed loans are defined here to include
certificates of beneficial ownership (C130s), which some
agencies issue. These CBOs are essentially ownership
clainis on a pool of loans, which themselves remain in the
agency’s possession. The C130s are then gmmaranteed by the
issmnng agency. Under present accounting procedures, CEOs
are not treated as agency debt.
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FFB debt intermediation (exhibit 2) Suppose the
agency has issued a new $10 million note which
the FFB purchases. The FFB, in turn, finances this
transaction by borrowing $10 million directly from
the Treasury. The Treasury issues $10 million of its
securities to finance its loan to the off-budget FFB.
This final transaction becomes part of the debt sub-
ject to the congressionally imposed statutory debt
limitation.
In the case of on-budget agencies, the discipline
imposed by the budget process may he compromised
when the FFB acquires loan assets from agencies or
loans guaranteed by agencies. This may occur because
of the way in which spending authorizations are deter-
mined. In calculating the outlay totals for budgetary
purposes for some on-budget agencies, repayments of
past loans to the agency and the sale of existing loan
assets are deducted from new loans. The resulting net
new loan figure is the basis for determining the agen-
cy’s budgeted outlays. For example, suppose an
agency is budgeted to make outlays of $10 million
and currently has outlays totalling $10 million, includ-
ing $7 million of loans. If it sells this $7 million of
loan assets to the FF13, its outlay’s for budgetary pur-
poses then would amount to $3 million.
Similarly, sales by an agency of guaranteed loans
are treated as an offset to the agency’s outlay totals
for budgetary purposes. In effect, these loan-asset and
guaranteed-loan sales become alternative means of
financing the agencies’ programs.
To illustrate this type of FFB intermediation,
exhibit 3 again presents the balance sheets of an
agency, the FFB, and the Treasury. Suppose the
agency grants a loan of $20 million to a borrower
(A) and finances this loan with a sale of its own debt.
If this debt is purchased by the FFB, the example
parallels exactly’ the case developed in exhibit 2. The
agency, however, can sell this loan (the loan asset)
Exhibit 3
Agency FEB
Assets Liabilities Asset Liabilities
Loan Assets Debt Loan Assets Borrowings
Nate from A $20 Million Not from A from Treasury
$20 MillIon $20 M’tlion $20 Million
Nate from A
$20 Million




Loans to the FEB Treosury Debt
$20 Million $20 Million
to the FFB if the loan is guaranteed by this or
another agency. Suppose the agency conducts such
a sale and uses the proceeds to issue a new loan
to another borrower (B). The net result of this trans-
action is that the agency’s balance sheet remains un-
changed. The FFB’s balance sheet now shows a $20
million loan asset (the note from A) and a $20 mil-
lion liability in the form of its borrowings from the
Treasury. Finally’, the Treasury’s balance sheet shows
a $20 million loan to the FFB and $20 million in
newly issued debt. The net result of this transaction
is that the Treasury has indirectly’ financed the exten-
sion of an agency loan. This process could, in prin-
ciple, continue repeatedly until the agency reached its
lending limit. Only the most recently granted loan
would appear on the agency’s balance sheet as a loan
asset (or note). The FFB, however, would be holding
notes on all previously’ granted loans while the Treas-
ury’s debt would expand to accommodate these
transactions.
When the FFB acquires a guaranteed loan from
an agency, the transaction effectively transforms a
contingent liability of the government (in the form of
a loan guarantee) into a direct loan by the Treasury.
This transformation occurs because the FFB finances
its acquisitions with loans from the Treasury, which,
in turn, finances the loan to the FFB by issuing new
debt. Thus, the FFB’s acquisition of guaranteed loans
or loan assets tends to distort the budget process by
lowering the outlay totals for budgetary’ purposes of
those agencies authorized to make such sales. Never-
theless, sales of loan asseLs and guaranteed loans to
the FFB, as well as the budgeted outlays, all ulti-
mnately affect the Treasury’s indebtedness.50
HiThe dramatic increasc in gmmarauteeml loans and thcir exten-
sive pmmrchase by the FFB has led to several, as yet nnsuc-
cesshml, legislative initiatives to limnit their use.
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A hypothetical example illustrates how these trans-
actions could distort what many people consider the
meaning of a “balanced” federal budget. Though it is
widely believed that a balanced budget implies no ad-
ditional federal borrowing, this is not necessarily
true. Suppose that all authorized and budgeted out-
lays of agencies are fully financed by tax receipts.
While the budget would be balanced, the Treasury or
the FFB would still issue additional debt if at least
one agency, whether on- or off-budget, grants loans
that are then sold to the FFB in a loan asset sale. In
this case, the net outlays of the agency remain un-
changed, but the Treasury’s debt rises when it fi-
nances the FFB’s acquisition of the loan asset.
The FFB’s operations have at least two additional
effects on capital markets. First, the agencies’ access
to funds via the FFB lowers their cost of funds rela-
tive to low-risk private borrowers. While govern-
ment insurance or loan guarantees for various pro-
grams have always given such programs a competitive
edge in financial markets, the method of placement
used before the FFB’s creation did involve an implied
market assessment of their riskiness. When different
agencies issued debt, the market implicitly made a rel-
ative evaluation of the various programs. Furthermore,
the cost of funds to the agencies prior to the FFB’s
creation was higher. This is evident from the fact that
in 1974 the FFB initially was lending to the agencies
at a 37.5 basis-point (% percentage point) premium
over the new-issue Treasury bill rate, This rate was at
or below the prevailing interest rate on agency secu-
rities at that time. This spread was reduced in two
steps (in November 1974 and May 1975) to the pres-
ent 12.5 basis points. In congressional hearings, these
reductions were said to have primarily reflected a nar-
rowing in the market spreads between yields on
agency and Treasury issues as the general level of in-
terest rates declined during the 1974-75 recession.”
Although such yield spreads tend to be cyclical, the
FFB’s lending rate has maintained the same 12.5 basis-
point spread over Treasury yields as interestrates have
risen during the 1975-79 expansion. Thus, agencies
can obtain funds at only a slight premium above the
Treasury’s own rates, a fact which may have the
additional long-run effect of encouraging agencies to
place more debt than otherwise.
A second effect the FFB has on capital markets re-
sults from the transformation of guaranteed loans into
direct loans. Before the establishment of the FFB,
insured agency loans were sold to the public in pri-
ilLoan Guarantees and the Federal Fimiancimmg Bank, Hearimigs
before the Subcommittee on Economic Stabilization. 95
Cong. 1 Sess. (GPO, 1977), p. 180.
Table 2




Year Federal Debt Debt Debt
955 S280.8 $27/.8 $ 3.0
I 956 280.0 2/6.1 4.0
1957 279.6 274.3 5.3
1958 283.7 777.2 6.5
1959 295.5 287.5 8.0
1960 298.6 289.1 9.6
1961 302.0 292.0 10.0
1962 311.7 299.5 12.2
1963 319.2 305.6 13.6
1964 328.3 312.7 15.6
1965 3361 318.5 17.6
1966 346.1 323.5 22.6
1967 361.4 334.1 27.2
1968 386.2 352.2 34.0
1969 401 I 363.7 40.4
970 444.1 375.6 48.6
1971 453.6 403.4 50.2
1972 485.4 432.5 52.9
1973 523.1 459.6 63.5
1974 556.1 477.7 794
1975 623.1 5355 93.2
1976 711.0 670.0 101.5
1977 7783 682.2 108.4
1978 864.9 7543 1249
1979’ 924.9 797.6 144.1
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table 3
Percent Changes in
Annual Averages of Outstanding Debt
Aggregate Treasury Agency
Year Federal Debt Debt Del,
1956 —0.3% —oo% 305%
1957 0,2 0.6 33.0
1958 1,5 1,0 243
1959 4 1 3.7 22.5
1960 1.1 0.6 201
1Q61 11 1.0 4.0
1962 32 2.6 219
1963 2,4 2.0 11 1
1964 29 2-3 15.1
1965 24 18 12.9
1966 3.0 16 285
1967 44 33 204
1968 69 5.4 248
1969’ 3,9 24 It?
1970 5.7 4 1 20.3
1971 69 7.4 3.4
1972 7.0 7.2 £4
1973 78 63 20.0
1974 6.3 3.9 25 0
1975 12.0 12.1 174
1976 141 15.8 8.9
1977 95 100 68
1978 111 10.6 15J
1979’ 69 57 154
Ba a on fi t i month of 979
direct loans to individual borrowers or through the
purchase of loans that were initiated in the private
sector. These government-sponsored agencies are
listed in panel C of exhibit 1,
The programs and debt of sponsored agencies are
not part of the unified budget, are not subject to the
debt limitation of Congress, and, except for the SLMA,
do not involve indirect FFB financing by the Treas-
ury. Many of these programs were converted to pri-
vate ownership and thereby removed from the bud-
getary process soon after Congress adopted the new
unified budget concept in 1987. Though these agen-
cies’ budgets are not directly subject to congressional
review, their activity is not completely independent
of the federal government. For instance, FNMA has a
guaranteed emergency access to Treasury’ loans up to
specific limits. Despite the formal distinctions imsually
mnade between the Treasury and the sponsored agen-
cies, the debt of these agencies constitutes a source
of federally related credit demand in U.S. capital
markets.
AGGREGATING FEDERAL DEBT
The sum of Treasury debt, federally owned on-
and off-budget agency debt, and federally sponsored
agency debt is a more appropriate measure of the
federal government’s full impact on U.S. credit mar-
kets. Since the FFB essentially converts agency debt
into Treasury debt, that debt which the FFB inter-
mediates must be deducted from the total. An exam-
ple will clarify this calculation.
When an agency issues debt to finance its programs,
that debt is counted in the total of agency debt out-
standing. When the FFB purchases this debt, it bor-
rows from the Treasury which, in turn, issues new
Treasury debt, thereby adding to the total Treasury
debt outstanding. A simple total of these two debt
categories essentially would count the agency-initiated
debt twice. For example, this double counting would
occur if, in exhibit 2, the debt of the agency and that
of the Treasury were added together. Since the FFB
essentially passed the agency debt through to the
Treasury, the debt should be counted only once. Sub-
tracting the FFB-financed debt eliminates this double
counting.12
Table 2 reports the annual outstanding debt of the
Treasury, of all agencies, and the sum of these two
categories (aggregate federal debt) after netting out
FFB debt financing. These data reveal a substantial
increase in the outstanding debt of the agencies.
(From here on, federally owned agencies and fed-
erally sponsored agencies -will be referred to as “agen-
cies.”) From 1955 to 1978, outstanding agency debt
grew at an annual rate of 17.5 percent while Treas-
ury debt grew at the much slower rate of 4.4
percent. In 1955, agency debt constituted only about
1 percent of all debt raised under federal auspices.
By 1978, it totalled more than 14 percent of all fed-
erally related debt.
Table 3 reports annual growth rates for the three
debt categories. Comparing the growth rates of Treas-
ury debt and aggregate federal debt reveals that ag-
gregate federal debt grew faster in every year except
1971, 1972, and 1975.77.13
12
0n]y FFB itstermediatio,s of agency debt needs to be netted
out of the total, since FF’E loan asset acquisitions, in effect,
transfomm agency assets into Treasury indebtedness, In ex-
hibit 3, adding agency debt and Treasury debt together
would entail no double counting.
1
3
A one-tailed t-test was performed on the mean difference
between the two growth rates, calculated over the period
1956-78. The tests confinned, at the .995 confidence level,
that the growth of aggregate federal debt was significantly
faster than the growth of Treasury debt.
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Chart 1
Change in Debt
Annual Averages of Monthly Figures
Not Seasonally Adiusted
Shaded areas represent pedods of bos~nessrecessions.
Latest data plotted 1978
Billions of Dollars
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The reversal of the growth trend from 1975-77 re-
quires some explanation. The sharp deceleration of
agency debt growth from 1975 to 1977 was accompa-
nied by a sharp acceleration of Treasury debt growth.
The annual growth rate of Treasury debt after 1974 is
more than four times its growth rate for the entire
period 1955-73. Since the post-1974 period spans the
life of the FFB, the data suggest that the FEB has,
in fact, transferred the debt financing operations from
the agencies to the Treasury. 1-lowever, the sharp ac-
celeration in the growth rates of both Treasury debt
and aggregate federal debt since 1974 can be only’
partially attributed to the effect of FEB financing,
since even budgeted programs have required unusu-
ally large debt financing in this period.
When the impact of government debt is measured
only by Treasury debt, a substantial portion of the
effect of federal programs on credit markets is over-
looked. The potential consequences of this oversight
can be illustrated with an example. The administra-
tion’s recent energy proposal calls for the establish-
ment of a “private” government-sponsored corporation
to develop synthetic fuels. Estimates of the additional
debt this corporation would issue run as high as $80
billion over the next decade. The debt of this federally
sponsored corporation alone would increase off-budget
agency debt by more than 60 percent over present lev-
els, yet would neither be included in commonly used
measures of the federal debt nor be reflected in the
official federal budget. Because the fund-raising ac-
tivities of all programs under federal auspices affect
capital markets, however, it is appropriate to examine
the total of federally related debt when analyzing the
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IMPLICATIONS OF AGGREGATING
ALL DEBT RAISED UNDER
FEDERAL AUSPICES
Federal Borrowing and the Business Cycle
When cyclical fluctuations in GNP growth are as-
sociated with similar fluctuations in private credit
demands, the government can avoid amplifying the
resulting interest rate cycle with its own debt opera-
tions. If increases in government debt are kept lower
during business expansions than during contractions,
pressures on interest rates from federal debt opera-
tions would be moderated over the business cycle.
Since a major objective of federal fiscal policy’ is to
counteract cyclical fluctuations in economic activity’,
and since fiscal actions re-
garding federal expenditures
and tax receipts are reflected
in the budget deficit or sur-
plus, changes in Treasury
debt could be expected to
vary countercydically.
An important distinction
between the activity of the
Treasury and the agencies
must be noted, however.
Federally owned and spon-
sored agencies’ activities fre-
quently are directed toward
allocating credit to specific
sectors of the economy. In
particular, a large portion of
total agency debt is used to
moderate cyclical fluctua-
tions in the housing sector.
Near the peak of business
cycle expansions, interest
rates generally have risen to
levels that approach or ex-
ceed regulatory ceiling in-
terest rates on time and sav-
ings deposits. Consequently,
financial intermediaries such
as savings and loan associ-
ations and mutual savings
banks have experienced diffi-
culty in attracting the funds
needed to maintain mort-
gage loan activity. Agencies
such as the FHA, GNMA,
and FNMA have attempted to offset this effect by’ in-
creasing their lending (or by purchasing loan assets) in
the housnig or mortgage markets, This activity has
been financed by increasing the agencies’ debt at or
near business cycle peaks. This implies a tendency
for agency debt to behave procyclically, in contrast to
the countercyclical behavior of Treasury’ debt,
Changes in Treasury debt outstanding (chart 1)
indicate that Treasury borrowing tends to follow
changes in the budget deficit (chart 2), rising during
recessions and declining near business cycle peaks.
Agency borrowing, on the other hand, tends to rise
just before the business cy’cle peak and to decline
after the onset of a recession. Since Treasury borrow-













1971 1972 1973 1974 1975
Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce and Federal
Latest data plotted: 3rd quarter
1976 1977 1978 1979
Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Page 17FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS
borrowing, changes in aggregate federal deht have
tended to mirror changes in Treasury debt. Neverthe-
less, ignoring the behavior of agency’ debt leads to an
overstatement of the degree to which government bor-
rowing has been countercyclical.
The effect of agency borrowing on cyclical move-
ments of interest rates is also important in examin-
ing the interaction of the federal government and
the Federal Reserve System. Through open market
purchases of government securities, the Federal Re-
serve can attempt to counteract the upward pressure
on interest rates that can occur when the Treasury
borrows. The extent to which Federal Reserve policy
accommodates Treasury debt operations is a critical
issue in the debate over the impact of government
deficits on inflation. Note, however, that the Federal
Reserve can undertake open market operations using
both Treasury and agency securities. One might ex-
pect then, that when the Treasury’ and agencies in-
crease their debt, the Federal Reserve would tend to
increase its holdings of both types of debt, In fact,
Federal Reserve holdings of agency securities have in-
creased substantially in recent years, rising from
less than $1 billion in early 1972 to more than $8 bil-
lion by August 1979.14 Consequently, studies of Fed-
eral Reserve responses to fiscal actions —such as the
issue of whether larger government deficits are asso-
ciated with higher money growth — should consider
the expenditures and debt operations of both the
Treasury and the agencies.
If off-budget agencies, especially the federally spon-
sored “private” corporations, continue to proliferate,
agency borrowing as a proportion of all debt raised
under federal auspices will become increasingly larger.
Consequently, the behavior of aggregate federal bor-
rowing over the business cycle could change signifi-
cantly if the federal government continues to rely on
these agencies to change the allocation of the econ-
omy’s resources while at the same time keeping their
outlay’s out of the budget process.
The iizgh-Lmpioyment Budget Concept
Since the early 1960s, many economists have em-
phasized that simple budget concepts overlook the
impact of economic activity on the budget. Specific-
t4On February 15, 1977, the Federal Ope’s Market Committee
amended its guidelisies for the conduct csi Federal Resorve
System operations in federal agency issues to take account
of the l”FB. Federal Reserve purchases csf agency securities
were limited to those agencies that are not eligible to
borrow funds frcsm the FF13, although securities issued by
tlse FFB itself may be purchased. Sec Board of Governors of




ally, during recessions the budget tends to fall deeper
into deficit as unemploy’ment insurance coverage and
other social programs expand. Some economists argue,
therefore, that the relevant measure of the budget’s
impact on the economy’ is a full-employment or high-
employment budget concept. This concept estimates
the size of the budget deficit or surplus that would
result if the economy were at a high level of employ-
ment. The high-employment budget deficit then meas-
ures the impact on the economy of the government
sector alone.
Chart 2 plots both the actual and the high-employ-
ment budget measures. These budget measures are
calculated on a national income accounts (NIA) basis
rather than the unified budget basis. The chief dif-
ference between the two methods is that the NIA
budget nets out all loan activity while the unified
budget does not. The NIA high-employment budget
concept is an unofficial measure that is used by the
Council of Economic Advisors and others for assess-
ing the impact of the government sector on economic
activity.15 The rationale for netting out government
loan activity is that such loans constitute a contingent
liability and are not truly expenditures. This ap-
proach, however, overlooks allocational effects of such
loans. Further, since the volume of such loans may
vary over the business cycle, the NIA budget con-
cept overlooks some important aspects of the rela-
tionship between government spending and economic
activity.
Measures of the high-employment budget ignore the
off-budget expenditures and receipts of both govern-
inent-owued and -sponsored agencies. Consequently,
the high-employment budget concept understates the
economic stimulus attributable to the federal govern-
ment. Since a major part of off-budget agency ac-
tivity involves loans, which the NIA budget concept
nets out, placing these agencies on budget would
have little effect on the currently constructed high-
employment budget. Any additional economic stimu-
lus generated by off-budget programs still would not
be taken into account when evaluating a high-employ-
ment budget measure.
Chart 2 shows that during the recent expansion
(1/1975-11/1979) the high employment budget was,
like the actual NIA budget, considerably in deficit.
‘°Though the idea of the high-employment budget has a long
history, it was first given prominence in a policymaking
context during the Kennedy Administration. For a discussion
of full-employment budget concepts and their application,
see Alan S. Blinder and Rcsbert M. Solow, “Analytical Foun-
datiosss of Fiscal Policy,” in The Economics of Public Finance,
(Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1974), pp.
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During the latter part of this period, accelerating in-
flation accompanied a rapid growth of agencies’ ac-
tivity, as reflected in their debt. Thus, at least during
the past year, the conventional high-employment
budget measure is likely to have understated the effect
of the government’s overall impact on the economy’.
Balanced Budget Proposals
Political pressure to contain government spending,
especially deficit spending, has increased during the
past few years. The most familiar proposals call for
a constitutional amendment either to balance the
budget, to limit federal spending to a specific percent-
age of GNP, or to limit tax revenues.
Debate on these issues has centered on a few key
arguments about the desirability and practicality of
such limitations. Both sides in this debate, however,
have often overlooked the federally owned and fed-
erally sponsored programs that are not part of the
budget. The existence of these programs and their
potential for expansion raises serious questions about
the effectiveness of constitutional amendments or leg-
islation directed at containing government spending.
For instance, Congress could satisfy requirements for
balancing the budget by removing some agencies and
their programs from the budget or by redesignating
them “private” institutions, as was done with the Fed-
eral National Mortgage Association in 1968, Either
action would improve Congress’ ability to balance the
budget, hut would violate the amendment’s intent,
Ignoring these potential congressional actions reduces
the likelihood that constitutional reforms, if adopted,
will achieve their supporters’ objectives.
SUMM.ARY AND CONCLUSIONS
While the function of federally owned and fed-
erally sponsored agencies primarily’ involves ques-
tions of microeconomic importance, these agencies
also generate effects that are macroeconomic in na-
ture. When fiscal policies are examined, the actions
of these independent, off-budget agencies are fre-
quently ignored. Aggregating these agencies’ debt
with Treasury debt is necessary to assess the full im-
pact of federal programs on the economy, especially
on credit markets.
The growth of off-budget spending, especially that
financed indirectly by the Treasury through the Fed-
eral Financing Bank, underscores the importance of
these agencies.In practice, the FEB permits some pro-
grams to be funded without undergoing congressional
review through the budget process.
When analysts evaluate the government’s cyclical
impact on capital markets and the economy, they
usually examine only the behavior of Treasury debt.
This approach, however, could produce misleading
conclusions since agency debt behaves differently over
the cycle than Treasury debt. Agency debt tends to
fluctuate procyclically, thereby dampening the coun-
tercycical effects of Treasury debt operations. Disre-
garding agency activity could also lead to incorrect
measurement of the fiscal impact contained in any
given “full-employment” budget measure.
Agency debt activity also has important implica-
tions for recent proposals to balance the budget. If
the alternative of financing federal programs through
off-budget agencies is overlooked, proponents of a
balanced budget may find that adoption of their pro-
posals will fail to achieve their objectives.
5
Page 19